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RELATED APPEALU.S. Security, et al. v. FTC, No. 03-6276 (10th Cir.)
INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY The do-not-call registry is the product of concerted, measured efforts byCongress and two agencies over more than a decade. When Congress passed theTelephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), it recognized that the nature andvolume of unwanted telemarketing had created significant intrusions into residentialprivacy that individuals were powerless to combat.  Congress authorized creation ofa do-not-call registry at that time, but gave the Federal Communications Commission(“FCC”) latitude to consider other options, such as requiring telemarketers to keeptheir own do-not-call lists.After years of experience with company-specific lists, the flaws in this mechan-ism were apparent.  The sheer number of callers posed formidable problems forconsumers, forcing them to deal with countless calls.  Only after it became clear thatconsumers were deeply dissatisfied with their limited ability to protect their homesfrom unwanted telemarketing did the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) and theFCC create the do-not-call registry, which Congress promptly funded and laterexplicitly ratified.  The registry gives consumers an additional tool to protect theirhomes from unwanted telemarketing, but otherwise restricts no speech.  No consumeris required to use the new mechanism.  To the contrary, a consumer must act to puther number in the registry, and can remove it if she is unhappy with the result.  Thus,no solicitor faces any obstacle in reaching a willing listener.
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Plaintiffs’ brief is bereft of any suggestion that consumers who use the registryare getting anything other than what they want -- the chance to protect their privacyat home from unwanted telemarketing.  Plaintiffs provide no reason to doubt that theregistry advances the protection of residential privacy.  Indeed, it is precisely becausethe registry is effective that plaintiffs oppose it.  Nothing in the First Amendmentrequires the government to limit consumer options to less effective tools.Although the registry advances a substantial government interest and restrictsno more speech than necessary, plaintiffs argue that it is fatally underinclusive.  Rely-ing on Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410 (1993), plaintiffs arguethat a regulation of commercial speech that directly advances a significant interest isinvalid unless Congress imposes identical regulations on noncommercial speech thatmight be thought to contribute to the same problem.  But Discovery Network did notwork the revolution in First Amendment jurisprudence that plaintiffs imagine.Instead, Discovery Network holds that, where a ban on commercial speech does notappear to advance the government’s interests, the government may not single outcommercial speech unless it has a reason for doing so that relates to its interests.  Thedecision does not suggest that Congress is barred from dealing with a major problemcaused by commercial telemarketing unless it deals with charitable and politicalsolicitation in the same way.
-3-
ARGUMENTI. THE DO-NOT-CALL REGISTRY IS A CONSTITUTIONALLYPERMISSIBLE REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL SPEECH.The government may regulate commercial speech if (1) its interest in doing sois “substantial,” and the regulation (2) “directly advances” that interest, and (3) “isnot more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest.”  Central Hudson Gas &Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 447 U.S. 557, 566 (1980).  “[T]he validity ofrestrictions on commercial speech should not be judged by standards more stringentthan those applied to * * * time, place, or manner restrictions.”  United States v. EdgeBroadcasting Co., 509 U.S. 418, 429 (1993).A. The Government Has A Substantial Interest In ProtectingResidential Privacy From Unwanted Commercial Telemarketing.Plaintiffs understandably concede the importance of the government’s interestin residential privacy, Br. 33, because “[i]ndividuals are not required to welcomeunwanted speech into their own homes and the government may protect thisfreedom.”  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 485 (1988).Plaintiffs nevertheless dispute that the government has demonstrated a “sub-stantial need” for the registry, arguing that the rule should apply both to more speech(by addressing political solicitations) and to less speech (because company-specificrules would be sufficient).  Br. 33-35.  These arguments restate plaintiffs’ position
-4-
with respect to other prongs of Central Hudson, but have no bearing on the incontro-vertible point that the interest “‘in protecting the well-being, tranquility, and privacyof the home’” is “‘certainly of the highest order in a free and civilized society.’”Frisby, 487 U.S. at 484 (quoting Carey v. Brown, 447 U.S. 455, 471 (1980)). Plaintiffs also confuse the interest in protecting consumers in their homes withregulations that would preclude unwanted speech generally.  Thus, plaintiffs mis-takenly liken the present case to Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205(1975), in which the Court struck down an ordinance that protected passersby fromfilms played at drive-in theaters.  Br. 22.  While the Court rejected that restriction asimpermissible censorship, it stressed that “[s]uch selective restrictions have beenupheld * * * when the speaker intrudes on the privacy of the home.”  Id. at 209.Indeed, the Court in Erznoznik contrasted the restriction in that case with that upheldin Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep’t, 397 U.S. 728, 738 (1970), explainingthat “individual privacy is entitled to greater protection in the home than on thestreets and noting that ‘the right of every person “to be let alone” must be placed inthe scales with the right of others to communicate.’”  422 U.S. at 209 n.4.
-5-
B. The Registry Directly And Materially Advances The Interest InResidential Privacy.Commercial telemarketers complete over 16 billion calls a year.  68 Fed. Reg.at 4630 n. 591.  Telemarketing calls, completed and abandoned, amount to as manyas 104 million calls a day -- a “fivefold” increase in the last decade.  18 FCC Rcd.14054 ¶ 66.  The record leaves no doubt that large numbers of people consider thesesolicitations a serious invasion of their residential privacy.  The do-not-call registrydirectly advances the privacy interests of consumers who wish to avoid those calls,by giving them an unmistakably effective way of doing so.Plaintiffs dispute none of this.  Instead, they urge that the registry does notmaterially advance the privacy interests of the persons who use it because it will notstop all solicitations.  But the government is not precluded from providing consumerswith an efficacious tool to protect their privacy because even more far-reaching toolsmight be possible.  It is axiomatic that the government can make progress on “onefront” of a potentially multi-faceted issue.  Edge, 509 U.S. at 434.  See also Virginiav. Black, 123 S. Ct. 1536, 1549 (2003) (government may address the most virulentinstances of proscribable speech without addressing all instances); R.A.V. v. City ofSt. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 390 (1992) (government may “address some offensive in-stances and leave other, equally offensive, instances alone”).  Contrary to plaintiffs’
-6-
unsupported assertion, the Supreme Court has never called this principle into ques-tion, and the courts of appeals have repeatedly recognized its continued validity.  SeeMissouri v. American Blast Fax, Inc., 323 F.3d 649, 656 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003), pet. forcert. pending, No. 03-507 (Oct. 1, 2003); Anderson v. Treadwell, 294 F.3d 453, 463(2d Cir. 2002); Moser v. FCC, 46 F.3d 970, 974 (9th Cir. 1995).Plaintiffs make no serious effort to explain how the registry can be analogizedto the municipal ordinance at issue in Discovery Network , in which an outright banon outlets for commercial speech had only a “paltry” impact on the city’s proclaimedinterest in advancing safety and aesthetics.  Id. at 417-18.  Even plaintiffs do notsuggest that the benefit received by the consumers who have already registered 50million numbers to avoid the 16 billion annual telemarketing calls could be character-ized in this fashion.  Moreover, as discussed below, it is also clear that the registry infact addresses both the primary source of telephone solicitations and those callswhich consumers regard as the greatest intrusion on their privacy.  See Part I.D. Plaintiffs mistakenly rely on decisions in which the link between the legislativegoal and a restriction on speech was attenuated and uncertain, cases in which it washoped that speech restrictions would discourage drinking, gambling or other conduct.See Greater New Orleans Broadcasting Ass’n v. United States, 527 U.S. 173 (1999);Rubin v. Coors Brewing Co., 514 U.S. 476, 488 (1995); Utah Licensed Beverage
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Ass’n v. Leavitt, 256 F.3d 1061 (10th Cir. 2001).  The uncertain connection betweenthe legislative purpose and the restrictions on speech was exacerbated because theschemes were “so pierced by exemptions and inconsistencies” as to wholly underminetheir efficacy.  Greater New Orleans Broadcasting, 527 U.S. at 190;  Leavitt, 256 F.3dat 1074  (state’s “scheme of advertising regulation must be considered irrational”).Here, by contrast, there is no attenuation:  the registry directly advances the interestsof the consumers who use it in order to avoid intrusions on their privacy.  See TransUnion Corp. v. FTC, 267 F.3d 1138, 1142 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (recognizing directadvancement of interest where “the speech itself * * * causes the very harm thegovernment seeks to prevent”).C. The Registry Is Narrowly Tailored To Allow Consumers To PostElectronic “No Solicitation” Signs For Individual Residences.As plaintiffs recognize, Br. 42, in regulating commercial speech, Congressneed not employ the “least restrictive means.”  A law must be upheld if it “‘promotesa substantial government interest that would be achieved less effectively absent theregulation,’” whether or not it is the “least intrusive” means of serving the govern-ment’s interests.  Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 799 (1989) (quotingUnited States v. Albertini, 472 U.S. 675, 689 (1985)).
1  See Moser, supra (upholding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b)(1)(B), which prohibits callsto residential lines using artificial or prerecorded voices without consent); AmericanBlast Fax, supra (upholding 47 U.S.C. § 227(b), which prohibits commercial faxsolicitations without consent); Destination Ventures, Ltd. v. FCC, 46 F.3d 54, 56 (9thCir. 1995) (same).
2  Although plaintiffs suggest that allowing internet sign-up for the registry hasresulted in unauthorized registrations, Br. 28 n.32, the two affidavits they citespecifically state that the affiants were authorized to register all the numbers theyregistered.  See PA 736, 748.  In any event, the FTC has adopted procedures toprevent abuse of internet registrations.  See 68 Fed. Reg. 4639.-8-
The do-not-call registry is singularly nonintrusive.  While other provisions ofthe TCPA bar some forms of unconsented solicitations outright -- and have consis-tently been upheld under the First Amendment1 -- the registry bars no communica-tions directly, but simply empowers consumers to avoid communications they do notwant.  Moreover, the registry, unlike the regulatory scheme at issue in  U.S. West v.FCC, 182 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1999), requires consumers affirmatively to “opt in,”rather than assuming their participation unless they affirmatively “opt out.”  Thisstructure precludes any suggestion that persons on the registry simply were insuf-ficiently motivated to remove themselves from its protections.2Plaintiffs misunderstand the full significance of the registry’s structure. Thegovernment is not mandating any restrictions on telemarketing directed to willinglisteners.  It simply provides consumers with a means to prevent such calls if they sochoose.  The registry thus contrasts starkly with the paternalistic restrictions on
3  The Court also stressed that the ordinance (unlike the registry) would havea debilitating effect on political discourse because “door to door campaigning is oneof the most accepted techniques of seeking popular support” for causes.  Id. at 146.-9-
speech in the cases on which plaintiffs rely.  In Martin v. City of Struthers, 397 U.S.141 (1943), see Br. 29, the city banned all door-to-door leaftletting for any purpose.The problem with the scheme was that “the ordinance * * * substitutes the judgmentof the community for the judgment of the individual householder.  It [punishesliterature distribution] even though the recipient of the literature distributed is in factglad to receive it.”  Id. at 143-44.3  The Court made clear, however, that citizens couldpost “no solicitation” signs on their property, and that the City could enforce atrespass statute against those who ignored them.The registry accomplishes precisely what Martin held to be consistent with theFirst Amendment.  It enables citizens to post an electronic “no solicitation” sign thatwould-be solicitors are required to honor just as they would be required to honor asign posted by the consumer’s door.Plaintiffs argue that the First Amendment precludes the government from giv-ing consumers the means to shield themselves from commercial telemarketing gen-erally, and that it can only offer consumers a company-specific list.  Br. 45-47.Plaintiffs’ contention that company-specific rules are equally efficacious or even pre-ferred by consumers is quite extraordinary.  Any consumer who wishes to rely on
4  Contrary to plaintiffs’ suggestion, Br. 11-12, 40, the FCC did not disavowthe relevance of the “increasing number of inquiries and complaints about tele-marketing practices.”  18 FCC Rcd. 14141, ¶ 216.  The FCC simply explained thatthe TCPA Order rested, not on complaints filed with the agency outside therulemaking proceeding, but on the “substantial record” that had been compiled in therulemaking, including “over 6,000 comments” filed by “consumers, industry, andstate governments * * * since September 2002.”  Id.-10-
company-specific rules can continue to do so.  But, as the overwhelming response tothe establishment of the registry indicates, millions of consumers have found such -rules inadequate to protect their privacy.  See 18 FCC Rcd. 14035, ¶ 29.  (“Consumerfrustration with telemarketing practices has reached a point in which many consumersno longer answer their telephones while others disconnect their phones during somehours of the day to maintain their privacy”).4  The First Amendment does not requirethe government to rely upon a means of regulation that will further its interests “lesseffectively” than the one it has chosen.  Edge, 509 U.S. at 430.A principal difficulty with company-specific rules is that the consumer mustrespond to thousands of calls from an ever-growing number of solicitors, requestingeach to add her name to a company-specific list.  See 18 FCC Rcd. 14067, ¶ 91.  Asone commenter observed, “[t]here are too many callers to possibly identify the callersand demand that they remove my name and number from the[ir] lists.”  EdwinHathaway, Durham, NC (FCC Nov. 4, 2002), PA 336.  The National Association ofAttorneys General (“NAAG”) similarly reported that the company-specific provision
5  See, e.g., Josephine Presley, Asheville, NC (FCC Oct. 29, 2002) (“up to 26telemarketing calls in one day”); Sandra West, Munday, TX (FCC Nov. 4, 2002)(sometimes “over 20 calls from telemarketers”); Joseph Durle, Fishers, IN (FCC Nov.18, 2002) (“up to 20 calls per day”); Benjamin Johnson, Urbana, IL (FCC Oct. 29,2002) (disconnected telephone after receiving “up to ten calls per day from tele-marketers”); Karen Meyer, Lake Orion, MI (FCC Dec. 2, 2002) (elderly motherreceives “u[p] to 10 solicitation phone calls per day”).  Comments filed in the FCC’sTCPA rulemaking proceeding are available on the internet by searching the FCC’sElectronic Comment Filing System at:  http://gullfoss.2.fcc/prod/ecfs/comsearch_v2/cgi.  Comments filed in the FTC’s rulemaking are similarly availableat:  http://www.ftc.gov/bcp/rulemaking/tsr/tsr-review.htm.-11-
is too cumbersome because 30,000 businesses are engaged in telemarketing.  JA 386;see also Garbin (FTC May 27, 2000) (first calls from telemarketers may result inthousands of calls per year).  The FCC noted “the burdens of making do-not-callrequests for every [telemarketing] call, particularly on the elderly and individualswith disabilities.”  18 FCC Rcd. 14030 ¶ 19; 14054, ¶ 66.  Indeed, comments indi-cated that some consumers received 20 or more calls daily.5  Because of the largenumber of telemarketers and the large number of telemarketing calls that some con-sumers receive, company-specific rules would be inadequate even if it were alwayspossible to make a do-not-call request and even if each request were promptlyhonored.Furthermore, the record is replete with evidence that company-specific requeststo telemarketers are frequently unavailing.  Commenters to the FTC reported thattheir do-not-call requests are ignored, and they have no way of verifying that they
6  Additional comments, also filed during the FTC’s 2000 Telemarketing SalesRule Review, confirm that consumers receive calls after making do-not-call requests(Anderson, Harper, Heagy, Nova, Nurik).  Other commenters also complained thatthe provision does not work (Gardner, A.) and that telemarketers maintain a “nocontact list” and refuse to honor the request of a consumer who asks to be put on a“do-not-call” list (Gilchrist). -12-
have been taken off a telemarketer’s list.  See 68 Fed. Reg. at 4629; 18 FCC Rcd.14030, ¶ 19.  For example, one consumer taped and logged all the telemarketing callsshe received over a two-year period, including numerous calls made in violation ofcompany-specific do-not-call requests.  Diana Mey (FTC April 24, 2000).6  Shereported that telemarketers used a variety of means to discourage her from making do-not-call requests, including requiring that she make the request in writing, requiringthat she give the name of every individual at her residence, hanging up before shecould make the request, and refusing to take her request until she had listened to astatement outlining all the future solicitations she would miss if she received nofurther calls from the company (and then hanging up before she could make her do-not-call request).  Id.  NAAG, reporting the experience of state attorneys general,similarly reported that some telemarketers require consumers to make company-specific requests in writing, while others require consumers to call back on anothertelephone number.  JA 387.
-13-
The FCC record is to the same effect.  For example, Thomas Pechnik of NorthRoyalton, Ohio, submitted comments to the FCC stating that he had sought on numer-ous occasions to have himself taken off company calling lists but was unsuccessful,that he had sued several companies for TCPA violations, and that he concluded that“[t]he company-specific do-not-call approach has been a dismal failure.”  PA 323.Others recounted similar experiences.  Sean Herriott, Canton, MI (FCC Nov. 22,2002) (“[s]ome telemarketers have called repeatedly even after I have asked them toadd me to their ‘do not call’ lists,” and “[o]ne called literally every two weeks for ayear; the same person would make the call each time, and deny that we had everspoken before (despite my getting his name and keeping a record of the calls”);Steven Thornton, Seattle, WA (FCC Sept. 27, 2002) (“Despite being on no-call lists,my household receives dozens of illegal telemarketing calls, including auto-dialedand recorded answer calls”); Mavis Selway, Mesa, AZ (FCC Oct. 30, 2002) (“I havespent many hours on the phone calling all the appropriate agencies to get us ‘off oftheir lists’ all to no avail.”).  See also ACUTA, Inc., at 2 (FCC Mar. 29, 2002) (“Ourexperience is that it is often very difficult to track down and make contact with thecompanies making the calls, and to place our telephone numbers on do-not-calllists.”).  
-14-
The FCC record also confirms that telemarketers avoid “do-not-call” requestsby hanging up rather than entertaining them.  See J. Raymonde de Varona, Lansing,MI (FCC Dec. 6, 2002) (“Several telemarketers avoid my request to be placed in  a‘Do Not Call’ list by hanging up as soon as I start to make the request”); MandyBurkart, Wellington, FL (FCC Dec. 2, 2002) (“I have asked the caller to providehis/her name and the company name, address and telephone number he is calling for.Their reply is a hang up.  How can I report or protect myself from companies who donot give the information?”).  Indeed, when the association representing universitytelecommunication administrators asked its members to obtain company names andcall back numbers of telemarketers so that they could place their numbers on do-not-call lists, “[s]tudents reported that the telemarketers sometimes quickly hung up whenthey requested name and contact information from the callers,” and this was“repeated on various campuses hundreds or thousands of time as calls were made toall campus residence phones.”  ACUTA, Inc., at 2.Problems of proof that a particular telemarketer called a particular number afterbeing requested not to call render enforcement of a company-specific regime difficultat best, as the consumer would not only have to keep records of all telemarketersasked not to call, but then also obtain and record information about the subsequentcall.  See Consumer.Net v. AT&T Corp., 15 FCC Rcd. 281, 291-95 ¶¶ 19-28 (1999)
7  Nevertheless, the agencies, as well as states and individual consumers, haveattempted to enforce the company-specific rules against telemarketers.  Although theFCC’s Consumer.Net decision dismissed several claims for lack of proof, it upheldothers.  See 15 FCC Rcd. 295-99, ¶¶ 29-39.  The FCC has also issued a number ofcitations against telemarketers for violation of the do-not-call rules.  See, e.g., Letter,July 18, 2002, Kurt A. Schroeder, FCC to Ad Resources, Inc.; Letter, Dec. 10, 2002,Schroeder to Newgen Results Corporation (available at: www.fcc.gov/eb/tsol.html).And just this week, the FCC issued a Notice of Apparent Liability that would imposea $780,000 forfeiture against AT&T for making 78 telemarketing calls to 29 residen-tial telephone customers who had previously asked not to receive such calls.  AT&TCorporation, FCC 03-267 (released Nov. 3, 2003).  See also Charvat v. ATW, 712N.E.2d 805 (Ohio App. 10 Dist. 1998); Adamo v. AT& T, 2001 WL 1382757 (OhioApp. 8 Dist. Nov. 8, 2001); Kaplan v. First City Mortgage, 701 N.Y.S.2d  859(Rochester City Ct. Dec. 8, 1999) (all awarding damages in private suits for violationof company-specific do-not-call requests).  Furthermore, contrary to plaintiffs’ mis-statement, Br. 11, the FTC has also brought cases charging violations of thecompany-specific do-not-call rule.  See FTC v. Epic Resorts, LLC, No. 6:00-CV-1051-ORL-19C (M.D. Fla.); FTC v. 1st Financial Solutions, Inc., No. 01-C-8790(N.D. Ill.). -15-
(dismissing company-specific do-not-call claims for failure to satisfy burden onproving violation).7Nor is there any merit to plaintiffs’ contention that the government failed to“adopt other obvious and less restrictive alternatives * * * that would have made thecompany-specific requirement even more effective.”  Br. 47.  Plaintiffs fail to notethat many of these suggestions were opposed by commenters as too costly.  See 18FCC Rcd. 14066-67 ¶ 88.  As for DMA’s Telephone Preference Service, it onlyapplies to DMA members, and even then is entirely voluntary.  68 Fed. Reg. 4631.
8  Although plaintiffs contend that “a range of technical alternatives haveevolved that give individuals a great deal of choice about the nature and volume ofcalls they receive from all outside sources,” Br. 24, the FCC found that “theavailability of certain network technologies to reduce telephone solicitations is oftenineffective and costly for consumers.”  18 FCC Rcd. 14041 ¶ 39.  “In particular,” theFCC explained, it was “concerned that the cost of technologies such as Caller ID, callblocking, and other such tools * * * fall[s] entirely on the consumer,” and that reli-ance on such solutions is therefore “inconsistent with Congress’ intent in the TCPA.”Id. -16-
Because the TPS is not “comprehensive,” Congress rejected reliance on it in passingthe TCPA.  H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 19-20.8D. The Registry Is Not Impermissibly Underinclusive.At bottom, plaintiffs’ argument is not so much that the registry extends toobroadly but that it sweeps too narrowly.  In plaintiffs’ view, the registry is fatallyunderinclusive because it does not give consumers the option to screen charitable orpolitical solicitations along with commercial telemarketing.This argument fails at every turn.  As the Ninth Circuit observed in Moser, inrejecting a challenge to provisions that barred pre-recorded but not live solicitations,“‘underinclusiveness’” may trigger a First Amendment violation only when a regula-tion represents an “attempt to give one side of a debatable public question an advan-tage in expressing its views to the people.”  46 F.3d at 974 (quoting City of Ladue v.Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 51 (1994)).  That is not the case here.
-17-
Plaintiffs suggest that the registry’s  “underinclusiveness” poses special prob-lems because the distinction between commercial and noncommercial speech is basedon content.  But as Central Hudson  explains, although the First Amendment prohibitscontent-based regulation in most contexts, the commercial speech doctrine allowssuch distinctions.  447 U.S. at 564 n.6.  Commercial speech limitations are commonlybased on the content of the speech being regulated.  See Trans Union, 267 F.3d at1141-42.  See also Lanphere & Urbaniak v. Colorado, 21 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir.1994) (recognizing commercial speech restrictions, though “content-based,” aresubject to Central Hudson scrutiny). Moreover, other authorities establish that the government should be more hesi-tant to regulate charitable solicitation than commercial speech because “charitablesolicitation does more than inform private economic decisions and is not primarilyconcerned with providing information about the characteristics and costs of goodsand services.”  Village of Schaumburg v. Citizens for a Better Environment, 444 U.S.620, 632 (1980).  Nothing precludes Congress from recognizing the characteristicsof charitable solicitation that distinguish it from commercial speech.Furthermore, plaintiffs’ argument fails to come to grips with a pivotal  featureof the registry:  that it does not itself bar speech, but simply provides an option to theconsumer.  The only consequence of alleged “underinclusiveness” in this context is
9  The fact that the Court gave plenary consideration to the asserted speechinterests there -- rather than rejecting them out of hand as commercial, see Valentinev. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52 (1942) -- simply reinforces the great weight it gave to theconsumer-choice aspect of that regulation.-18-
that the consumer receives less protection from telephone intrusion than she mightwish for.  If the consumer determines that the protections the registry affords areinadequate, or that they are outweighed by the loss of valued communications, shepresumably will not sign up.  The Supreme Court has long recognized the proprietyof regulations of this sort, which leave the decision whether to allow intrusion intothe home “where it belongs -- with the homeowner himself.”  Martin, 397 U.S. at143-44 (contrasting such regulation to prohibition on door-to-door solicitation);Rowan, supra (upholding consumer-initiated prohibitions on offensive mailings).Plaintiffs note (correctly) that Rowan pre-dates development of the commercialspeech doctrine and contend (incorrectly) that it entailed no governmental distinctionsbased on content.  Br. 28-29.  Rowan is directly pertinent.9  The Court upheld thestatute at issue although it involved a content-based distinction between erotic“advertisements” and other mail that consumers might find similarly offensive.  TheCourt has made clear that this holding retains its validity because “selective restric-tions” that would otherwise be invalid may be upheld when “the speaker intrudes onthe privacy of the home.”  Erznoznik, 422 U.S. at 209 & n.4.  These cases recognize
-19-
that, wholly apart from any commercial/non-commercial distinction, regulations thatsimply allow consumers to exercise control over communications into the home mustbe upheld even if they have limitations in scope that are content-based.Plaintiffs attempt to avoid all of the foregoing principles, based on theirmisreading of Discovery Network.  Plaintiffs disregard the Court’s admonition thatits holding was “narrow,” and that it was only concluding that, based on the recordbefore it, Cincinnati had “not established the ‘fit’ between its goals and its chosenmeans that is required * * *.”  Id.  at 428.  The Court did not convert distinctionsbetween commercial and noncommercial speech into “content discrimination,” anddid not establish a new prohibition against “underinclusiveness.”  To the contrary, asthe Court itself emphasized, its holding was based on the lack of any connectionbetween the statute’s goals and its provisions.  The city had restricted the dissem-ination of commercial information for no legitimate purpose and had signally failedto consider other obvious alternatives that might actually have furthered its assertedinterests.  Id. at 428.  That holding provides no basis for invalidating the registry,which bans no speech, gives consumers a highly effective means of preserving theprivacy of their homes, and is based on a decade of experience that demonstrated theflaws of the regulatory mechanism that plaintiffs insist should be the sole protectionoffered to consumers.
-20-
Finally,  plaintiffs have no cogent response to the evidence before Congressand the agencies regarding the role of commercial telemarketing in generating con-sumer dissatisfaction.  Plaintiffs dismiss out of hand the legislative record cited inAmerican Blast Fax and Destination Ventures.  Br. 39  n.43.  As the Eighth Circuitnoted, however, the “legislative record” of the TCPA “indicates that commercial callsconstitute the bulk of all telemarketing calls * * *.”  323 F.3d at 658;  accordDestination Ventures, 46 F.3d at 56 (upholding statutory ban on commercial faxesbecause the bulk of unwanted faxes are commercial).  As the Eighth Circuit alsoexplained, Congress, in enacting the TCPA, found that “non-commercial calls * * *are less intrusive to consumers because they are more expected.”  323 F.3d at 655.Contrary to plaintiffs’ contentions, the data from state consumer protectionagencies considered by Congress was absolutely clear and was not misunderstood bythe courts reviewing TCPA challenges.  Those states with complaint data brokendown by category reported that between 80 and 99 percent of complaints involvedcommercial calls.  Plaintiffs attempt to obscure the import of the legislative record byurging “that up to half the complaints in other states mentioned in the House Report* * * related to charitable or political calls.”  Br. 39.  What the Report actually states,however, is that the four other states reporting data indicated that “that consumer
-21-
complaints about unsolicited telemarketing involved calls that were ‘mostly commer-cial’ in nature.”  H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 16.  Congress’s understanding that commercial telemarketing constituted the bulkof telephone solicitations is borne out by experience under state regulatory schemes.For example, the registry established by the State of Missouri, which, like the nationalregistry, applies only to commercial telemarketing, resulted in a reduction of calls by70 to 80 percent.  68 Fed. Reg. at 4593 n.140, 4633 n.642.  And the information pro-vided by the telemarketers themselves reflected their own estimation that the do-not-call rule as initially proposed -- i.e., without coverage of entities subject only to FCCjurisdiction, such as banks and common carriers -- would reduce telemarketing byabout half.  See 68 Fed. Reg. at 4631.  Ultimately, while it is impossible to quantifythe precise impact of the registry, there is no reason to think that Missouri’sexperience is anomalous.  See 18 FCC Rcd. 14054 ¶ 67 (“[t]he history of state-administered do-not-call lists demonstrates that such do-not-call programs have apositive impact on the ability of many consumers to protect their privacy by reducingthe number of unwanted telephone solicitations that they receive each day.”).Plaintiffs observe that some states receive complaints about calls exempt understate law as well as covered commercial calls (although these often concern calls that
10  See Plaintiffs’ Br. 39, 12 n.13.  Missouri’s comments indicated that 20percent of complaints it received involved entities exempt under that state’s law --including banks and telephone companies -- and another 20 percent of complaintswere invalid for reasons that had nothing to do with the identity of the caller. TSRForum, Transcript 6/5/2002 at 206.  This information casts no doubt on the fact thatcommercial telemarketing constitutes the majority of telephone solicitations and themajority of calls that consumers find most objectionable. -22-
would not be permitted under less expansive federal exemptions).10  They aredoubtless correct that some consumers would prefer the option of barring solicitationsaltogether, and doubtless also correct that some consumers will prefer to rely oncompany-specific rules and will not enroll in the registry at all.  Neither point raisesany question as to the constitutionality of a tool that provides consumers the optionof avoiding all commercial telemarketing.II. THE FCC REASONABLY DECLINED TO ADOPT SPECIAL RULESTHAT  WOULD H A V E  E X E M P TE D  C O M PE T I T I VETELECOMMUNICATIONS CARRIERS FROM THE DO-NOT-CALLREGISTRY.Petitioner Competitive Telecommunications Association (“CompTel”) -- atrade association representing competitive telecommunications carriers -- argues thatthe TCPA’s exemption for calls to persons with whom a telemarketer has “an estab-lished business relationship [EBR],” 47 U.S.C. § 227(a)(3), unfairly burdens newcompetitive carriers relative to established incumbents, since the latter already havebusiness relationships with virtually all subscribers in their regions.  CompTel claims
-23-
that the FCC had an obligation to alter (in unspecified ways) its approach with respectto telemarketing by telecommunications carriers to take account of the pro-competi-tion policies of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251, et seq.CompTel Br. 5-9.CompTel’s argument largely ignores the fact that the TCPA -- not the 1996Act-- supplies the statutory authority under which the FCC adopted its do-not-callrules.  The TCPA is a privacy statute, not a competition statute -- indeed, its fun-damental instruction is that the FCC implement rules “concerning the need to protectresidential telephone subscribers’ privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicita-tions to which they object.”  47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1) (emphasis added).  The establishedbusiness relationship exemption is “grounded in the consumer’s expectation ofreceiving the call.”  H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 15.  The FCC explained that exempting “asolicitation to someone with whom a prior business relationship exists does notadversely affect subscriber privacy interests.” 7 FCC Rcd. 8770 ¶ 34; see generally68 Fed. Reg. 4591-94.CompTel makes passing reference to the requirement of § 227(c)(1)(A) that theFCC compare alternative methods and procedures both “for their effectiveness inprotecting * * * privacy interests” “and in terms of their cost and other advantagesand disadvantages” -- suggesting that this provision may be read to inject the FCC’s
-24-
local competition policies into its TCPA analysis.  CompTel Br. 7-8.  CompTel doesnot indicate that this textual argument was ever presented to the FCC, however, andwe are not aware of its having been made.  This Court, accordingly, should not con-sider it.  See 47 U.S.C. § 405(a) (filing of a petition for administrative reconsiderationis a condition precedent to judicial review where party seeking review “relies onquestions of fact or law upon which the Commission * * * has been afforded noopportunity to pass”); State Corporation Comm’n of Kansas v. FCC, 787 F.2d 1421,1427 n.4 (10th Cir. 1986) (argument not raised before the FCC “is therefore notproperly presented on review”).In any event, the TCPA’s legislative history suggests that the direction to con-sider countervailing costs in the FCC’s choice of a method of protecting consumerprivacy was addressed primarily to the direct costs of implementing and administer-ing a national do-not-call database -- not to the types of indirect competitive burdensthat CompTel asserts here.  See H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 20-23.  The responsible Con-gressional committee stressed, moreover, that it “expects the Commission to choosethe alternative that is most effective in protecting telephone subscriber privacy.”  Id.at 19.  With respect to the role of the “established business relationship,” in particular,Congress indicated that the relevant “balance” was between “barring all calls to thosesubscribers who objected to unsolicited calls, and a desire not to unduly interfere with
11  CompTel errs in asserting that the FCC arbitrarily declined to exercisediscretion available to it on the mistaken view that the TCPA required it “to privilegeconsumer privacy above all else, whatever the harm to other congressional policiesthe FCC must implement.”  CompTel Br. 7 (citing 18 FCC Rcd. 14085 ¶ 122).  Thesentence fragment CompTel quotes to support that claim correctly recognizes theTCPA’s “mandate” to adopt rules to protect consumer privacy, but it does not state,or fairly suggest, that the FCC believed itself powerless to consider competitivefactors in tailoring those rules. -25-
ongoing business relationships.”  Id. at 13 (emphasis added).  CompTel’s competitivearguments do not advance its case with respect to that balancing.  Finally, even if§ 227(c)(1)(A) were read more broadly, it would not require the FCC to subordinatethe specific privacy goals of the TCPA to the general competitive objectives of the1996 Act.11CompTel’s brief before this Court does not endorse -- or even describe -- anyparticular alternative to the rule it challenges.  But the FCC, in fact, addressed andreasonably rejected alternative proposals.  It considered two proposals by CompTelmember MCI to redefine the statutory EBR exemption -- either to include all telecom-munications carriers within the exemption (regardless of any actual customer relation-ship) or, alternatively, to exclude incumbent carriers from the exemption altogether.18 FCC Rcd. 14085 ¶ 121.  However, neither proposal provided a remotely plausibleconstruction of “established business relationship,” and the FCC reasonably rejectedthem.  The latter proposal (narrowing the EBR exemption) would impermissibly have
-26-
extended the ban on telemarketing to calls that fall outside the scope of “telephonesolicitation[s]” proscribable under § 227(c).  And the former proposal (broadeningthe exemption) not only stretched the statutory term beyond recognition, but alsoconflicted with the TCPA’s purpose “‘to protect residential telephone subscribers’privacy rights to avoid receiving telephone solicitations to which they object.’”  18FCC Rcd. 14085 ¶ 122 (quoting 47 U.S.C. § 227(c)(1)).  In particular, Congress hadincluded the EBR exemption in the TCPA because it saw calls from businesses withwhom customers have established relationships as being more expected and thus lessobjectionable.  H.R. Rep. 102-317, at 14.  That reasoning has no application whereno business relationship exists and the customer has “expressed a desire not to becalled by registering with the national do-not-call list.”  18 FCC Rcd. 14085 ¶ 122.The FCC also considered another proposal that would have limited the EBRexemption to the particular services that the carrier provides its customer, so that anincumbent telephone company could not use its status as a customer’s local serviceprovider as a basis to make telephone solicitations regarding other (for example, long-distance or internet access) services.  See 18 FCC Rcd. 14084-85 ¶ 120.  However,competitive carriers also opposed that proposal, because they, too, wanted the flexi-bility to market additional products to their customers.  Id.  CompTel does not contest
-27-
before this Court the FCC’s conclusion that such a restriction “would not be in thepublic interest.”  18 FCC Rcd. 14085.Having seriously considered the arguments of competitive carriers regardingthe “potential effects of a national do-not-call list on competition in the telecommu-nications marketplace,” the FCC rejected the specific alternative proposals before it.18 FCC Rcd. 14085 ¶ 122.  Although those proposals, in the FCC’s judgment, failedeffectively and efficiently to carry out the purposes of the TCPA, the FCC also foundthat the rules being adopted would leave new entrants with a number of effectivemarketing opportunities:  carriers would “still be permitted to contact [by telephone]competitors’ customers who have not placed their numbers on the national list” (18FCC Rcd. 14085-86 ¶ 123); they would still “be able to call their prior and existingcustomers” under the EBR exemption (id.); and “[f]or the remaining consumers withwhom common carriers have no established business relationship and who are regis-tered on the do-not-call list, carriers may market to them using different advertisingmethods, such as direct mail.”  Id.The Supreme Court has emphasized that “a court is not to substitute its judg-ment for that of the agency,” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Ins. Co.,463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983), a point that is “especially true when the agency is called uponto weigh the costs and benefits of alternative policies.” Consumer Electronics Ass’n
-28-
v. FCC, No. 02-1312, slip op. 20 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 28, 2003).  Although CompTeldislikes the line that the FCC reasonably drew after balancing the privacy andcompetitive concerns presented to it, it makes no effort to identify or defend a differ-ent line.  Its petition for review should be denied.III. THE FTC’S FEE RULE IS CONSTITUTIONAL.The fees the FTC charges telemarketers for access to the registry are consti-tutional because they do not constitute a revenue-generating tax.  See Plaintiffs’ Br.49.  To the contrary, those fees are used only to defray expenses associated with theregistry and related law enforcement efforts directed at telemarketing.  Even withrespect to activities protected by the First Amendment, the government may chargefees necessary “to meet the expense incident to the administration of the act and tothe maintenance of public order in the matter licensed.”  Cox v. New Hampshire, 312U.S. 569, 577 (1941).  That is precisely what the FTC is doing here.There is nothing “hazy” about how the FTC will spend the $18.1 million in feesCongress authorized it to collect.  See Br. 50.  The FTC contracted to pay $3.5million in connection with creation of the registry.  That amount, however, does notinclude the FTC’s internal expenses related to the creation and maintenance of theregistry, costs of processing consumer inquiries and complaints, administrative andinfrastructure costs associated with the registry (including consumer and business
12  See 68 Fed. Reg. 45141;  http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2003/11/dnc031103.htm,(as of November 3, 2003, the FTC had received more than 51,000 complaints fromconsumers regarding telemarketers who continue to call).-29-
education), or the costs of investigating violations and enforcing compliance with theregistry and other provisions of the TCFPA.  68 Fed. Reg. 45141.There is no basis for plaintiffs’ speculation that the FTC will use the fees “forgeneral agency outreach functions and technical systems.”  See Br. 49.  These sys-tems are being upgraded to manage the significant impact of the registry on theagency’s existing infrastructure.  In particular, the systems must handle the massiveinflux of consumer complaints related to the registry that the FTC projected it wouldreceive, and that it has, in fact, received.12  Because all of the uses to which the FTCis putting the fees are “incident to the administration of the” TCFPA, the fees areconstitutional.  See American Target Advertising, Inc. v. Giani, 199 F.3d 1241, 1248-49 (10th Cir. 2000) (upholding against First Amendment challenge fees imposed onfundraising consultants that were used to enforce anti-fraud law); National AwarenessFoundation v. Abrams, 50 F.3d 1159, 1164-67 (2d Cir. 1995) (upholding fees paidby professional fundraisers that defrayed both administrative expenses and costs oflaw enforcement).
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CONCLUSIONFor the foregoing  reasons, as well as those stated in our Consolidated OpeningBrief, this Court should reverse the district court decisions in U.S. Security andMainstream, and deny the petitions for review of the FCC’s Order.Respectfully submitted,
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